Context
In the 1971 India - Pakistan war, Pakistan's submarine - PNS (Pakistan Navy Ship) GHAZI, was destroyed and sunk off the coast of Vishakhapatnam (India's Naval Base on the East Coast facing the Bay of Bengal) sometime between December 3, 1971 (the day Pakistani Air Force fighter planes attacked major air bases in India, and started the war), and December 5, 1971.
India claimed that Ghazi was destroyed and sunk in course of Naval operations, by INS Rajput (a guided missile destroyer of the Indian Navy). This Naval victory was widely publicized by the Indian Navy and the Government, as part of its war time propaganda to demoralize the enemy - Pakistan, and to raise the morale in India in general.
However, with passage of time, the credibility of this claim waned, as various agencies - individuals who saw action in the Naval war, and war historians delved deep into the information available.
To this day, it is not clear at all, as to how the GHAZI sank.
Background
Pakistan in 1971 consisted of two parts West Pakistan, on India's west, and East Pakistan on India's east.
The Naval war in the East was fought under Indian Navy's Eastern Command, headquartered at Vishakhapatnam. Vice Admiral N. Krishnan was the Commander-in-Chief. The role of the Indian Navy in the East was offensive - tp attack from the sea which was south of East Pakistan, while the Army attacked from the East, West and North, decimate the Pakistan Navy, and capture the main Naval port of Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar, thus hastening the liberation of Bangladesh.
In August 1971, the Indian Navy transferred its only aircraft carrier- "INS VIKRANT" to the Eastern Naval Command, as part of the strategic build up to the expected war. This forced Pakistan to alter its plans regarding submarine operations. A submarine was far more capable of approaching any aircraft carrier stealthily, and destroying it, as compared to any other Naval vessel).
In response to India moving VIKRANT to the Bay of Bengal, Pakistan decided to depute the GHAZI to the Bay of Bengal - a distance of almost 4000 kms. The mission was a daring one - to sail all the way from Karachi which was her base and search and destroy the VIKRANT expected to be sailing in the Bay of Bengal.
The strategic soundness of this plan was without question. The GHAZI was the only ship in Pakistan's fleet with the range and capability to fulfill that task. The plan had the ingredients of daring and surprise, both needed to undertake a mission so far away and deep inside enemy waters.
Indeed, had the GHAZI been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier, it would have caused a major set back to the Indian Navy. The naval situation in the Bay of Bengal would have undergone a drastic transformation, and carrier-supported military operations in the coastal areas would have been affected.
The PNS Ghazi (S–130) ; was a Tench-class diesel-electric and the first fast-attack submarine in the Pakistan Navy. She was leased to Pakistan by the United States ((previously USS Diablo) in 1963 and saw action in both 1965 and 1971
It is significant to note that the GHAZI had ageing machines and equipment and it was perhaps not sustainable to keep her operative so far from her home base, with total absence of repair and maintenance facilities or logistics and recreational facilities. Even Chittagong - the major Naval base in East Pakistan did not have repair facilities for submarines.
In light of the above considerations, the 'Captain Submarines' - Pakistan Navy (an officer who is overall custodian and officer in-charge of submarines in any Navy), placed on record his serious reservations regarding the proposed mission. However, the possibilities of a success were far in favor of undertaking the mission, and any reservations against it were dropped or overruled.
Operations
On November 14, 1971, the GHAZI under command of Commader Zafar Mohammad Khan, sailed out of Karachi. Ghazi was on a two-fold mission: the primary goal was to locate and sink Vikrant and the secondary mission was to lay mines across India's eastern coast areas with high naval traffic. The second mission was to be fulfilled irrespective of the accomplishment of the first. Notably, Commander Khan was commanding a submarine for the first time in his career.
Commander Zafar Mohd. Khan (PN)
Ghazi was to send a 'mission report' to her base on an assigned date - November 26, 1971. No contact was however made by the vessel on that date, causing huge anxiety to the Pakistani Naval authorities. Frantic efforts were made to establish contact with GHAZI, with no results.
Major General (Retd) Fazal Muqueem Khan (Pakistan Army) writes in his book titled " Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" that the first inkling of a tragedy they got was when an Indian Navy signal claiming the sinking of GHAZI, on the night of December 3/4, (the signal was issued strangely, on December 9), was intercepted. The signal itself was transmitted on December 9, and mentioned the sinking of GHAZI on December 3. This itself was suspicious, and raised speculations that the GHAZI was sunk at a time when the war had not been officialy declared (sometime before December 3 when Pakistan attacked Indian air bases) and Indian involvement in the East Pakistan crisis would have come out in the open. The failure of GHAZI to communicate after November 26, lent credence to this theory.
From the Indian perspective, the threat from GHAZI to the VIKRANT was fully known and appreciated. There were four surface ships available to the Eastern Command - one of which did not have anti-submarine detection capabilities. So, unless the other three were in close proximity to the VIKRANT at tall times, the threat to the aircraft carrier was real and serious.
So the plan to keep the VIKRANT safe involved deception and other tactics.
The first action was to literally 'hide' VIKRANT. So after embarking the full compliment of aircraft upon the carrier, the VIKRANT and the remaining ships in the fleet, sailed for some unknown destination which would keep her hidden yet operational.
The next step was to deceive and mislead the GHAZI about VIKRANT's location, lure her there and attack her. A lot of false messages were sent to the Naval base at Madras (now Chennai) about the arrival and berthing facility of the VIKRANT. Similarly, at Vishakhapatnam orders for food and logistics were stepped up and publicized in the hope that this activity would be reported by Pakistani intelligence operatives in the area, to Pakistan, and would point to the possible movement of the VIKRANT around VIZAG.
INS RAJPUT was used as a decoy to lure GHAZI into thinking it was the VIKRANT. This was again done by exchanging heavy signal traffic between VIZAG base and RAJPUT as if the ship was VIKRANT. This tactic worked, as was proved later through a signal recovered from the sunken GHAZI,which was sent from Pakistan and alerted the GHAZI about the presence of the aircraft carrier around VIZAG.
Message to Ghazi indicating presence of INS VIKRANT in Vishakhapatnam
The war officially commenced on December 3, 1971, and the Eastern Naval Commander received orders to 'commence hostilities'
GHAZI had reported her reaching the BAY of Bengal, on November 20, 1971, when her Commanding Officer was instructed to open the top secret files with the mission details. (It so happened that by the time Commander Khan learnt of the mission to seek and destroy the VIKRANT, the carrier was already tucked away safely. Frustrated at not being able to detect the VIKRANT, the GHAZI proceeded to Vishakhaptnam to complete her second mission which was to lay mines around the naval base there, which was a 'target rich' area with many India warships.
The mystery behind the sinking of the GHAZI
On December 1, 1971, Admiral Krishnan summoned Lt. Commander Inder Singh, the Commanding Officer of INS Rajput, and shared with him the fact that the PNS GHAZI, last detected around Sri Lanka, was bound to be in the vicinity of Vishakhapatnam. He instructed Lt. Cdr. Singh, to leave port immediately after refuelling.
On the night of December 3, at 1030 pm, INS Rajput left the harbour, and after exiting, entered a narrow channel. At this time, one of the 'watches' on duty reported a 'breaker' on the water surface, dead ahead. Cdr. Singh changed course went full speed, and dropped two depth charges (bombs set to explode under water on impact with another object) at the spot where the break was observed. There was a stunning explosion. A little while later, the Rajput left the area and proceeded on course towards East Pakistan.
The explosion
There were numerous eye witness accounts who confirmed at around midnight on 3/4 December, a very loud explosion was heard in the waters. These statements and versions came from Naval personnel across ranks, who were either on duty at that time, or were in the vicinity.
The next morning - December 4, fishermen reported seeing flotsam (the wreckage of a ship or cargo found floating on or washed up by the sea).
On the morning of December 5, the clearance diving team of the Indian Navy commenced search operations under water.
The divers found the GHAZI sunk in fairly shallow water. She was lying straight, without any tilt whatsoever.
The first diver surfaced and reported that the vessel sunk was a submarine. The second diver reported that it was a fairly large submarine. With the help of photographs and other data provided to the diving team as a reference it was concluded that the vessel sunk was indeed the GHAZI.
How did the GHAZI sink?
Essentially there could have been three possible causes for the explosion and sinking of the GHAZI
1. That the GHAZI had been hit by the drop charges dropped by the RAJPUT as it exited the VIZAG harbour. In effect the RAJPUT destroyed and sunk the GHAZI.
2. Something went wrong inside the submarine. Two things could have gone wrong inside so as to cause an explosion.
a. Some of the ordinance that the GHAZI was carrying, exploded accidentally. This means either the torpedoes or the mines that were part of the armament.
b. The Hydrogen inside the submarine exploded. Hydrogen accumulation takes place during normal charging and discharging of the submarine's batteries. A submarine of the displacement of GHAZI would have something like 350 tonnes of battery. In a 1900 ton submarine having 350 tonnes of battery, a hydrogen explosion can be crippling.
Once diving operations commenced, a lot of first hand observation reports of various divers threw a lot of light on the possible causes of the explosion or sources of the explosion. The following is the summary of the observations and the inferences drawn
1. The hull of the GHAZI had clearly been blown outwards, which led to the inference that the explosion was internal.
2. Because the hull of the submarine had been blown outwards at mid section and not forward right where the torpedo tubes are, chances are that it was the Hydrogen that caused the explosion.
3. It is also possible that a mine had blown up accidentally inside, causing the explosion. Mines that are laid outside the vessel are safe for 12 hours after being laid, to enable the laying vessel to get away to safety. But an accident could take place inside, due to the mines being very old, or poorly maintained.
There is also some evidence that signals intercepted from the GHAZI indicated that there was something wrong with her mines.
This theory could not get adequate support as the divers could not find any remaining mines that could be examined.
4. The explosion seemed have been contained in a small section of the submarine, although it was severe enough to blow a hole outwards and sink the vessel. This was proved by the fact that the rear end of the submarine was relatively unscathed. When provisions inside the submarine were examined the divers were surprised to find that even eggs were totally intact.
5. A torpedo does not get fully armed until after it runs out. Torpedoes exploding within the tubes is unlikely because there are so many in built interlocks. Unless the forward caps are open, the torpedo cannot be armed. So many interlocks exist in the configuration of the firing devices, that anything to do with impact can be ruled out. If the 6 or 8 torpedoes she was carrying in the forward tubes or the torpedoes in the racks had exploded, the entire submarine would have blown up and nothing would have remained. In this case most of the submarine was intact.
6. Another theory gaining salience at that time was that the GHAZI had got her torpedoes ready to be fired and was cruising along just above the surface to the sea bed. There is a little ridge which runs out along the coast, slightly to the North of Vizag harbour. The theory is that the GHAZI did not know of the existence of this ridge and that while cruising along, she actually bumped into it and the collision triggered off the torpedoes which were already armed. One of them blew up and then subsequently all the others blew up along with it causing the GHAZI to go down.
Conclusion
There was ample evidence to show that an internal explosion was the cause of the sinking of the GHAZI. This evidence was provided by observations of the type and extent of damage to the submarine. For one logical reason or the other, damage from an external source was ruled out as the cause. Whether Hydrogen accumulation, or a mine exploding or a torpedo exploding was the real cause has not been determined without doubt, till date.
The Controversy
1. Lt. Genl. Jacob, the Chief of Staff, Eastern (Army) Command who played a pivotal role in the operations leading to the fall of East Pakistan, writes in his book 'Surrender at Dacca - Birth of a Nation'
'We had signal intercepts of the GHAZI, a Pakistani submarine, entering the Bay of Bengal and we had passed on this information to the Indian Navy.
“On the morning of 3 December, Admiral Krishnan, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of our Eastern Naval Command, telephoned me to say that the wreckage of a Pakistani submarine had been found by fishermen on the approaches to the Visakhapatnam port. Krishnan said that the blowing up of the GHAZI, either on 1 or 2 December whilst laying mines, was an act of God. He said it would permit the Navy greater freedom of action. Next morning on 4 December, Krishnan again telephoned asking me whether we had reported the blowing up of the GHAZI to Delhi. I said that we had not as I presumed that he had done so.
Relieved, he thanked me and asked me to forget our previous conversation. The official naval version given out later was that the GHAZI had been sunk by the ships of the Eastern Fleet ..'
2. In 1972, both the United States and the Soviet Union offered to raise the submarine to the surface at their expense. The Government of India, however, rejected these offers and allowed the submarine to sink further into the mud off the fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam.
3. In 2010, it was reported that Indian navy had destroyed all records of sinking Ghazi submarine. All related files were destroyed. One of the retired navy officers who saw the action in 1971 said that the destruction of the Ghazi papers and those of army in Kolkata depicts the many instances when Indian war history has been deliberately falsified.
In 2011, former Indian naval chief, Admiral Arun Prakash quoted in the national security conference that [Ghazi] had sunk under mysterious circumstances, "not by INS Rajput as originally claimed."
Why did the PNS GHAZI sink? There will never be a closure to this controversy. Did the Indian Navy sink destroy and sink PNS GHAZI? This seems to be the least likely cause of GHAZI's sinking and the Indian Navy's claim has never been confirmed.
Inputs mainly from:
'Transition to Triumph' by Vice Admiral (Retd) Gulab Hiranandani
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